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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper it to identify how corruption can impact government expenditures,
specifically education as a percentage of GDP, educational as a percentage of total government
expenditures, health as a percentage of GDP, and health as a percentage of total government
expenditures. The independent variables in which will be used for this model are: Corruption
Perception Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Polity IV. Through the time period of
2005 to 2014, this research is a global panel study that looks at income group and regional analysis.
Comparisons will be made from the correlation of the variables between country groups and the
global analysis to try and further understand on how corruption impacts countries differently.
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1.0 Introduction
Corruption has many avenues for an individual to replace the benefit of people within a
country with their own benefit. For example there is bribery of public officials/politicians for
favors such as tax evasion, or other rents, or to even bypass regulation and create favored
regulation. Corruption within the private economy induces economic cost of business which has a
negative impact on the population as well. The creation of monopolies through government and
private economic transactions make hard lines for entry to market. This hurts innovation for new
business, labor productivity, and investment into firms within a county’s economy (Chêne, 2014).
But the corruption being looked at by this study is specifically government corruption that
misallocated resources in tern altering the composition of government expenditures. These
avenues are “white elephants”, which are government contracts or projects that benefit the person
through bribery or embezzlement far greater than say additional education labor (Mauro, 1995).
Due to corruption’s negative impact on avenues of approach in social programs or poverty
alleviation, the misallocation of resources to the most lucrative benefit of the individual creates a
systemic hurdle for human development. The has a negative impact on income distribution in the
form of the poor not getting economic opportunities as well as a middle income class that would
under normal conditions use their taxes as leverage to hold a government accountable. For example
in a panel data study by Gyimah-Brempong (2001), African countries that had a one point increase
in the corruption index, had a seven point increase in the Gini coefficient with income inequality.
Research on corruption is important not only to expose corruption within countries but to
help prevent it. Research that helps identify not only the impacts of corruptions but the
determinates of corruption as well. For example aid in Africa. In the book Dead Aid by Moyo
(2009), aid is shown to be a determinant of corruption. The book explains how aid is given to
governments in hopes they use it to better human development and economic growth, but the
reality is aid fosters government corruption. It gives a resource for the individual to embezzle
rather than use it to better human development and economic development. Within the last 50
years over $1 trillion in aid has been given to African countries but income per capita is lower than
it was in the 1970’s as well as adult literacy rates. This book helps explain that mistakes made and
ways to prevent the fostering of corruption at a systemic level. The aid is not reaching the resources

to help the people such as education and health which improve lives as it was intended for. This
study will help contribute to the understanding of how corruption impacts the government not just
within a global view but a view of region and income level as well.

2.0 Trends
The general trends for corruption often deterer many variables including economic output.
Figure 1 from the World Bank explains the relationship between control of corruption, a variable
used in this paper and GDP (current international $). Even in 2011 there are clear signs that
corruption has a strong impact on a countries economy. And within that impact standards of living
such as health and education worsen. Some believe that there is a reverse causality between these
variables. The statement is that high quality institutions takes a lot more money to get that way, in
turn being able to fight off corruption. That may be true, but later in this paper high income groups
are found to have a stronger correlation with corruption and government expenditures than low
income groups (OECD, 2014). This gives counter evidence to reverse causality theories.
Corruption has also had a negative effect on the human development index. In figure 2
there correlation between HDI and Corruption Perception index from Transparency International
is strong. A country with a higher CPI score will tend to have less corruption. Though there are
solid differences in levels between different regions. Figure 3 shows the same strong correlation
but between CPI and mean school years (Ospina and Roser, 2016).

3.0 Literature Review
One of the first published studies to be done on corruptions impact on government
expenditures was from Paola Mauro. His work throughout the 1990’s shows the negative impacts
of corruption on not only economic growth but government expenditures (Mauro, 1998). He used
the Bureaucratic Efficiency Index to look at corruption, bureaucratic red tape, legal system, GDP
per capita (1960-1985), and other variables to look at the correlation between corruption and his
research. He also uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument for likelihood two people
of a country will have the same ethnicity, this is because he believes that the more homogeneous
a country is the more corrupt they might be. The model was a paneled OLS average of 1970 to
1985 for a sampled 100 countries, which determined that there was a significant negative
correlation even regardless of the bureaucratic red tape of different countries on government
expenditures. (Mauro, 1995). The R-squared was around 26 percent. This was some of the first
published evidence that corruption has a negative impact on government expenditures not only on
health but on education.
Though a global empirical analysis is helpful, this study is designed to look at specific
groups as well. For instance the OECD country’s correlation between corruption and government
expenditures. In a 21 country pooled panel from 1998 to 2011 by Jajkowicz and Drobiszová (2015)
looked at the log of defense, education, public order, health, and other dependent variables with
the independent variables of the log of CPI, GDPPC, and tax to find a relationship. The results
showed a significance of less than .001 between the log of heath and CPI as well as tax. It also
showed a significance at 10% for the log education and CPI. The study found that with an increase
in CPI, meaning less corruption, there will be an increase of 0.25 p.b to health and 0.11 p.b to
education. This is interesting as it shows a correlation between countries within different regions.
It gave evidence that corruptions impact is wide spread even to developed countries globally.
To hone in on the correlation between corruption and government expenditures the next
step was to look at regional study. Hashem (2014) published a study that looked at 13 Arab
countries in a pooled panel from 1998 to 2008. Though due to data unavailability 1998 to 2008
had a total of 4 countries and 2003 to 2008 had the other 9. The study looked at the distortion of
government expenditures in health and education not only as a percentage of GDP by a percentage
of total government expenditures as well. The author talks about the backslides in CPI of certain

countries such as Egypt by also talks about the growth in countries such as Qatar increasing is
country rank by 10 from 2003 to 2009. The results of the regional model of the dependent variables
of government expenditures and CPI was determined to be significant with a probability of more
than 95 percent in education and health expenditures. Meaning with an increase in CPI government
health and education expenditures would increase as well. Though the percent of the data that is
explained by the model is relatively low with an R-squared of .10 for education and .13 for health.
Another grouping this study tries to look at is countries grouped by income level. A study
by Korneliussen (2009) broke down countries by income level and looked at corruptions impact
on decentralization of fiscal government spending, and how decentralization effects the
composition of government expenditures. This helped pave the way and give an interested variable
of decentralization. The author makes the argument that decentralizing governments can lead to a
decrease in social government spending. In the yard stick model explained that with an increase in
taxes there is capital flight, so jurisdictions choose lower tax rates which could possible lead to
lower government spending due to less tax revenue. An interesting non-direct effect of corruption
of government expenditures could possible with that tax evasion creates less tax revenue for a
government. The model is using CPI, government expenditures, tax, and if a country is a federal
government. With an OLS model of 160 countries from 1984 to 2008, the author explains the
weakness of the empirical analysis. Though there was some significance when grouped by income
groups, the data availability for a global analysis create a barrier to further analysis of the author’s
model.

4.0 Model and Definition of Variables
The empirical model consist of a panel study from 2005 to 2014 as a random effect model.
As a global model, random effect was used because variation across entities is random and
uncorrelated within the model. The reason for this is to show the correlation of a global analysis
between the independent and dependent variables. The model will also have dummy variables for
income and region. This could show that countries within income and region groups have a much
major difference in correlation due to the group they are in versus a global analysis. This process
could give a better understanding of the correlation between corruption and government
expenditures within region and income. The research that has been looked at mostly is comprised

of OLS and Pooled models which is not as accurate for controlling against omitted variable biases
as fixed and random effect models. Since the independent variables of CPI and control of
corruption are highly correlated they were not ran together as well as the independent variables
control of corruption and government effectiveness. The model is below.
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸.𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶.𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The dependent variables consist of government expenditures in health and education.

Though there is one model, it as ran for each dependent variable. Model 1.1 is government
education expenditures as a percent of GDP. Model 1.2 is government health expenditures as a
percent of GDP. Model 1.3 is education as a total percent of government expenditures. Model 1.4
is health as a total percent of government expenditures. The source of the data is from the World
Bank. They collect data from many sources globally but the main source of health and education
expenditure data collect was from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics and World Health Organization Global Health
Expenditure database.
Polity as an independent variable is important to the understanding of government type.
The source is from Center for Systemic Peace and looked at political regime characteristics for
167 countries from 1946 to 2015. The Polity IV Project measures a county’s level of democracy
within the definition of an institution which its people can express their preference and keep its
government in check as a civil liberty. Its range is from an open democracy (2.5) to an autocracy
(-2.5). An autocracy restrict government that limits the rights of its people with few institutional
constraints. This measurement is important to understand how corruption acts within different
forms of government.
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as an independent variable looks at perceived
corruption of countries. The source of this Index is from Transparency international look at 176
countries from 1996 to 2015. The index is a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) for each
country. This index is created using 13 different sources that capture the perceptions of corruption.
A few example of these sources are the Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide,
Global Insight Country Risk Ratings, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, and World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. This organization looks to shed light on corruption
that undermines a countries growth in many areas.

Worldwide Governance Indicators are another important independent variable. The source
of this data is from the World Bank but it takes from 30 different surveys, commercial business
information providers, non-government organizations, and public sector organizations. They data
collected if for a global index for over 200 countries from 1996 to 2015. The variables that are
indexed are voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and
control of corruption. Some examples of the sources used are Global Integrity, Freedom House,
French Ministry of Finance Institutional Profiles Database, Economist Intelligence Unit, Political
Risk Services, and Gallup World Poll. Though one of the sources for control of corruption includes
CPI, so a model cannot use both at the same time. The index for control for corruption takes into
account many variables such as irregular payments in public contracts, public trust in politicians,
diversion of public funds, and corruption among public officials. Control of corruption in my
opinion has a better representation of corruption the CPI. But another variable to look at is
government effectiveness which takes into account quality of primary education, coverage area:
public school, satisfaction with education system, and government handling of public services:
Health /Education.

5.0 Data and Empirical Results
Figure 4 shows the pooled data within the model. The scatter plot’s correlation mostly
shows a positive slope. As the score gets better for CPI, government effectiveness, polity, and
control of corruption; expenditures on health and education increase. The figure even shows a clear
visual understanding of how country income effects the correlation. The slope is very much
different for each income grouping. And income groups are strongly grouped together within the
plotting. Though the pooled data is not fully accurate. It will not show us what a random or fixed
panel regression will, so further analysis is needed. Many countries have a severe lack of data to
use this accurate model, which is why most of the literature is OLS or pooled based data analysis.
Though even within that limitation there is evidence backing up this study’s hypothesis.
The global random effects panel in table 1 gives said evidence from 2005 to 2014. It shows the
four different dependent variables of health and education government expenditures with the
independent variables showing the quality of government effectiveness, type of government, and
corruption of country.

Within table 1 model 1.1 evaluates the significance of the dependent and independent
variable. Government education expenditures as a percentage of GDP is significant below 0.05
level with control of corruption and a 0.10 level with CPI. The non-highly significance and the 20
percent R-squared show that though there is a correlation between the variables it does not explain
the full story of determinates of government education expenditures. This is a sharp contrast to
model 1.2 which is government health expenditures which shows a 0.05 P-value or less for all the
independent variable accept polity. Model 1.3 shows no significant correlation what so ever, also
a contrast to model 1.4 which is strongly correlated with the exception of CPI. This is evident that
with one increase in the standards deviation of the strongly correlated independent variables there
will be in increase in government health expenditures as a percent of GDP and as a percent of total
government expenditures. The R-squared is relatively small, but fits the pattern of the literature
reviewed. Health expenditures has a stronger correlation that education but both have an R-squared
of below 35 percent and the R-squared is relatively low in the other studies reviewed. Though
education seems to not have a strong correlation the paper will break the global model down to
show that is not the case, especially when looking at Africa and high income countries.
The global model does have a major limitation and that is unbalanced data on a global
scale. Health data has over four times as much observation as education data. The lack of data
within the education expenditures limits the accuracy of the model. The unbalanced representation
of global data could also skew the results, for instance lower income and middle lower income
countries had the least observations but within those observations alone the correlation between
the dependent and independent variables could be much higher. Education in North America did
meet the required accuracy the model required, so U.S. and Canada were excluded. CPI in the U.S.
has been in the 70’s range since 1996 and in 2016 was 74. This could have been valuable to see
how the U.S. compares to other developed countries such as Canada which had an 82 on the CPI
index in 2016. Table 2 represents the distinct count by income and region for each regression ran.
The description gives a unique understanding of the data. There is a lack of observations in general
for low income grouped countries, both in health and education expenditures. Another observation
from the table 2 is that Europe and Central Asian have the most observations in every regression.

Table 1: Random Effects Panel Regression
VARIABLES

Model 1.1
Model 1.2
Government
Government
Expenditures: Education Expenditures: Health as
as a Percent of GDP
a Percent of GDP

Model 1.3
Government Expenditures:
Education as a Percent of Total
Government Expenditures

Control of Corruption

0.3767415**
0.3320713***
-0.2395856
(0.1558)
(0.1167)
(0.8231)
Corruption Perception Index
0.0170345*
0.0111244**
0.0122382
(0.0097)
(0.0056)
(0.0336)
Polity
0.0353574
0.0135208
-0.0750845
(0.0224)
(0.0138)
(0.0791)
Government Effectiveness
0.0803
0.3769415***
0.0470233
(0.2469)
(0.3143)
(0.8539)
Constant
3.3461***
3.52558***
15.22675***
(0.4676)
(0.3011)
(1.6138)
Observations
306
1379
304
Countries
34
138
34
R-squared
0.200
0.1401
0.0288
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Control of corruption ran separately from other independent variables.
Source: Author's calculations from Stata
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Distinct Count of Model's Representation for Region and Income

Region and Income
Region
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
North America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Income
High income
Low income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Source: Author's calculations from excel

Model 1.4
Government Expenditures: Health
as a Total Government
Expenditures
1.214436***
(0.2248)
-0.0269132
(0.0126)
0.1042175***
(0.0300)
1.858604***
(0.3057)
12.18864***
(0.6062)
1480
148
0.22.5

Model 1.1

Model 1.2

Model 1.3

Model 1.4

6
9
6
3
0
1
9

16
37
24
14
2
6
39

6
11
6
3
0
1
9

17
41
24
17
2
6
41

11
5
6
12

37
25
38
38

12
5
7
12

43
25
40
40

A graphical example to demonstrate these grouping differences is below in figure 5. Model
1.1 is broken down by region and filtered by income. Lower income and lower middle income is
filtered and the regions are separated to show that regionally corruption effects government
expenditures differently. Sub-Saharan Africa is the perfect example. The R-Squared for the model
in Sub-Saharan Africa is over 52 percent and highly significant compared to the non-significant
20 percent R-squared of the global model. This is due to the difference on how corruption effects
government within different regions. In Africa aid funding often promotes corrupt governments
and in lower income countries the output is reduced because the money transferred from the state
to the individual. Nigeria president Sani Abacha embezzled $5 billion from his country. Africa
also has widespread institutional decay to due conflict and corrupt public officials. It shows a major
contrast to the other lower income regions of the world. Though due to data availability it is more
difficult to analyze and compare the regional differences to get a full picture.
Another grouping breakdown through the Table three’s panel regression with income
levels as a dummy variable gives proof that corruption has different effects on countries within
income levels. The global model 1.3 had no significant correlation between variables, but the
model accounting for the dummy variable within income groupings show a different story. Control
or corruption and CPI become significant at a 95 percent or higher level. Also high income
countries become highly correlated with the model compared to any other income levels. With the
addition of figure six, evidence of the difference between income grouping and the global model
further support that hypothesis that corruption acts differently between region and income. This
gives possible evidence for a counter argument of those who believe in the reverse causality
between corruption and economic output. Where high income countries spend more money to
create higher quality institutions. If that were the case then the model would show a weaker
correlation between high income groups corruption and government expenditures. The quality of
the institutions system would be able to fight corruption better. But that is not the case within the
evidence given.

Table 3: Random Effects Panel Regression with
Dummy Variable

VARIABLES
Control of Corruption

Government Effects

Model 1.3
Government Expenditures: Education as a
Percent of Total Government
Expenditures
2.084976***
(0.7214)
1.893142*
(0.9653)

CPI

0.0622986**
(0.0361)

polity2

-0.0697084
(0.0753)

High Income

-7.794649***
(2.4168)

Low Income

3.413909
(2.1815)

Lower Middle Income

3.36908*
(1.9603)

Constant

13.71092
(1.7114)

Observations
304
Countries
34
R-squared
0.023
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Control of corruption ran separately from
other independent variables.
Source: Author's calculations from Stata and Tableau
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion
The model within this paper has been accurate, but there are limitation of data availability.
Further research would have to be done to not only obtain missing data but to also further explain
how corruption acts different within regions and income levels. This paper’s objective was to show
that there are differences and provide evidence. The independent variable polity did not have any
real impact on the dependent variables so this would not be included in future research. This is
very interesting due to the nature that a stable government democratic government has the image
of a more secure public expenditure system to benefit the welfare of its people.
Using a more accurate panel model for 2005 to 2014 (2005 to 2013 for education
expenditures) improved the understanding of the variable relationships. The dummy variables in
model 1.3 further proved that each income level and region have to be researched specifically. A
global analysis of corruption is important, but the purpose of research is to expose and prevent.
The same methods cannot be used as a blanket plan of action to reduce corruptions effects. U.S.
corruption versus Gambia corruption have different perceptions, determinants, and even effect a
country differently. Most literature does just this, from looking at OECD countries or Arab
countries. Though with possible omitted variable biases, evidence was found. The evidence of
corruptions relationship with government expenditures on health and education on a global
spectrum as well as by region and income.
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